5ASR3d61

Series: 5ASR3d | Year: () | 5ASR3d61
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AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

 

v.

 

.145 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, OF LAND AND

RIGHT-OF-WAY TO THE LAND IN SQUARE 28, UNIT D, IN THE VILLAGE OF TAFUNA, COUNTY

OF TUALAUTA, WESTERN DISTRICT, ISLAND OF TUTUILA, AMERICAN SAMOA,

NEIL ANNANDALE, and DOES I-X,

Defendants/Counterclaimants/Cross-Claimants,

 

v.

 

AMERICAN SAMOA POWER AUTHORITY, and

FLETCHER CONSTRUCTION, Cross-Defendants.

 

High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division

 

CA

No. 36-95

March

14, 2001

 

 

[1] The tort of

trespass to land is the unlawful interference with its possession.

 

[2] The only

intent needed to be proven in order to establish the tort of trespass is the

intent to enter another’s land, regardless of the actor’s motivation.

 

[3] In a civil

trespass case, the claimant must establish (1) unlawful interference with the possession of property, (2) which

is the result of intentional,

reckless, negligent or ultrahazardous activities, (3) where plaintiff

attempted to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred,

and (4) the entry of some other person or thing.

 

[4] Where employees of construction company, while on

contract with public utility, entered private landowner’s property; destroyed a

cement wall, chain-link fence, mango tree, plants and shrubs; and dug a trench

in the ground without first obtaining easement or making arrangements to obtain

one, such conduct constituted a trespass.

 

[5] As a

general rule, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm

resulting from that contractor’s acts or omissions.

 

[6] If an employer

employs an independent contractor to do work, which he knows or has reason to

know will likely involve a trespass upon the land of another, he is liable for

harm resulting to others from such trespass.

 

[7] The court

will construe pleadings and their amendments liberally, in order to do

substantial justice, even if the pleadings occasionally do not strictly comply

with formal requirements.

 

[8] In the

absence of any apparent or declared reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.,

–leave to amend a complaint should, as the rules require, be freely given.

 

[9] Where

defendant/cross-claimant had not moved to amend cross-claim, but simply added

extraneous language to his trial memorandum, despite having more than five

years time to so move, court would not accept implicit “amendment” of cross-claim

because of the undue delay, prejudice resulting to other parties.

 

[10] A minimum

requirement for a party’s amendment of pleadings is that it submit a motion for

leave to amend under T.C.R.C.P. 15 (a).

 

[11]

Compensatory damages are designed to compensate for actual injury or loss, and

punitive damages are awarded as punishment or deterrence for particularly

egregious conduct.

 

[12] In

trespass actions, compensatory damages are to be measured by (1) diminution in

value, i.e., difference between market value of land before and after the harm,

or cost of restoration when appropriate, (2) loss of use of the land, and (3)

discomfort and annoyance to the occupant of the land.

 

[13] In

trespass actions, proof of pecuniary loss is required.

 

[14] In trespass

actions, where substantial actual damages are not susceptible to precise proof,

the damage entitlement is limited to nominal damages.

 

[15] Where plaintiff in trespass action had testified

that defendants had destroyed plants, fences and walls on his land, but had

failed to present any evidence regarding the market value of such items, court

would not award compensatory damages.

 

[16] Although

plaintiffs are normal required to prove the market value of items destroyed by

a trespass, a “restoration cost exception” exists where the landscaping and

vegetation destroyed have intrinsic value to the landowner and are located on a

homesite or recreational lot.  In such

cases, intrinsic value is assumed, and evidentiary support is not required.

 

[17] In trespass actions, restoration cost damages may exceed the

diminution in market value of the real property on which the vegetation grew.

 

[18] Where property and vegetation

damaged as result of trespass was on rental property, court refused to award

restoration cost damages.

 

[19] Punitive or exemplary damages

may be awarded whether or not compensatory damages are awarded, in order to

punish a wrongdoer as well as to deter other from similar future misconduct

which resulted in injury, loss or detriment to another. 

 

[20] In order

to award punitive damages in a trespass action, the trespasser’s conduct must

have been wantonly reckless or malicious.

 

[21] Although trespassing parties’ actions did not

appear to have based on any evil intent, they nonetheless were done with

reckless disregard for rights of private property owner, in violation of

written contract and public utilities’ rules, and despite repeated requests to

cease.  Consequently, punitive damages

were warranted.

 

[22] In

trespass cases, damage awards must be trebled where the damage is to timber,

young tree growth, products of tree growth, or cultivated grounds without

lawful authority or permission.

 

[23] Attorney’s

fees are not ordinarily recoverable by a prevailing party, but may be awarded

when an opposing party has acted in bad faith, wantonly, oppressively or when

required by statute.

 

[24] Where

public agencies and their agents had acted oppressively and in wanton disregard

of the valid property claims of an individual citizen, court determined an

award of attorney’s fees to be proper.

 

OPINION

AND ORDER

 

Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice,

SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Judge, and TAUANU`U, Temporary Associate Judge.

 

Counsel: For Plaintiff,

Fiti A. Sunia, Attorney General

 For Defendant, Charles V. Alailima,

 For Cross-Defendants, Roy J.D. Hall, Jr.

 

In 1995, plaintiff American Samoa Government (“ASG”)

initiated this action pursuant to A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1001-.1036 to condemn

interests in land of defendant Neil Annandale (“Annandale”) in Tafuna for installations

connected with the public sewage collection system in this area.  By this action, ASG sought to acquire a fee

simple interest in approximately 0.045 acre along the southern boundary of the

land (“Parcel A”) and a right-of-way in approximately 0.10 acre across the land

(“Parcel B”).

 

ASG declared the value of the interests to be

$4,000.00 for Parcel A and $50.00 for Parcel B, and deposited the total sum of

$4,050.00 in the Court registry, in accordance with A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1001 and

43.1003.  By this making this deposit,

ASG immediately acquired title to the interests desired, pursuant to A.S.C.A. §

43.1005.  ASG also served Annandale with

process and, under A.S.C.A. § 43.1002, gained the right to possess and use

those interests.

 

When Annandale answered the complaint, he rejected the

amount of the compensation deposited.  He

also counterclaimed against ASG and cross-claimed against defendants American

Samoa Power Authority (“ASPA”) and Fletcher Construction (“Fletcher”) for

damages based on trespass on Annandale’s land, allegedly beginning on or about

January 23, 1995, and destroying plants, fences and walls.

 

In view of Annandale’s objections to ASG’s estimated

values of the condemned interests in the land, determination of the

compensation amount was referred to arbitration, pursuant to A.S.C.A. §

43.1010.  On August 19, 1996, the

arbitrators awarded $5,800.00 for Parcel A and $50.00 for Parcel B.  Annandale accepted the award for Parcel A,

and on December 15, 1997, the Court’s partial judgment and order was entered

with respect to this parcel, confirming ASG’s title to Parcel A and requiring

ASG to pay $5,800.00 to Annandale for this parcel.

 

Annandale appealed the award for Parcel B.  On May 19, 1997, the Appellate Division held

that the arbitrators failed to support the award for Parcel B with findings and

conclusions, and remanded this award to the same arbitrators for further

proceedings and a determination, based on written findings and conclusions, to

be submitted to this court.  The Attorney

General has informed the Court that the arbitration award for the Parcel B was

made in December 2000, but the arbitrators have yet to publish their decisions.

 

Trial on the trespass claims

was held on July 10, 2000, and this opinion and order is limited to those

claims.  The two issues before the Court

are (1) whether the actions by ASPA and Fletcher constitute trespass, and if

so, (2) whether and what damages ASPA and Fletcher owe to Annandale.

 

Discussion

 

I.  Trespass

 

[1-2] This Court declared its

standard for trespass in Letuli v. Le`i:

 

The tort of trespass to land is the unlawful interference with its

possession. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 13, at 70 (5th

ed. 1984).  It may be committed as the

result of an act which is intentional, reckless, or negligent, or as the result

of ultrahazardous activity. Gallin v. Poulou, 295 P.2d 958,

959-62 (Cal. App. 1956).  The only intent

required is the intent to enter another’s land, regardless of the actor’s

motivation. Miller v. National broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.

668, 676-77 (Cal. App. 1986).  Trespass

may occur by causing the entry of some other person or thing. Restatement

(Second) of Torts §158 (a), at 277 (1965).

 

Letuli v. Le`i,

22 A.S.R.2d 77, 82 (Land & Titles Div. 1992).

[3] We read the rule applied in Letuli

to mean that in adjudging whether trespass has occurred in civil cases, the

claimant must establish (1) unlawful interference with the possession of

property, (2) which may be the result of intentional, reckless, negligent or

ultrahazardous activities, (3) where there existed an attempt to be at the

place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred, and (4) which may

consist of the entry of some other person or thing.  We find that ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher did

trespass upon Annandale’s land based on these four criteria.

 

[4] On or about Monday, January

23, 1995, employees of Fletcher, while on contract with ASPA, entered

Annandale’s land and destroyed a cement wall, a chain-link fence, a mango tree,

plants and shrubs, and dug a trench in the ground.  At the time, ASPA had not obtained an

easement from Annandale for use of his land, nor had Fletcher remedied this

oversight by making arrangements to obtain one.

 

Annandale appropriately and immediately notified ASPA

authorities through legal counsel, but none of these parties responded to his

appropriate protest against Fletcher’s invasion of Annandale’s land. Fletcher

thus engaged in repeated intentional acts consisting of unpermitted and

uninvited infringement upon, injury to, and invasion of Annandale’s land.

 

[5-6] ASG and ASPA are liable with

Fletcher for trespass as employers of that independent contractor.  As a general rule, the employer of an

independent contractor is not liable for harm resulting from that contractor’s

acts or omissions.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 409 (1965); Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 83.  However, if an employer employs an

independent contractor to do work which he knows or has reason to know will

likely involve a trespass upon the land of another, he is liable for harm

resulting to others from such trespass. 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (1965).  Here, ASPA hired Fletcher to institute an

underground sewer line, which work inherently implies effacement and

destruction of Annandale’s land.  ASG and

ASPA had reason to know that Fletcher’s work would involve trespass; their duty

was to secure authorization for the intended work activity, so as to render the

encroachment and conversion of Annandale’s property lawful.  The contract between ASPA and Fletcher, with

respect to the necessity and distribution of responsibility for obtaining

easements, confirms ASPA’s awareness of the potential for trespass and

consequent liability involved in contracting for sewer line placement.  Because they did not obtain valid

authorization, ASG and ASPA are liable for harm resulting from their

independent contractor’s physical trespass.

 

ASG and ASPA claim that they acted with Annandale’s

consent to work on the property, and argue that they are thus not liable for

co-opting it. However, they have failed to convince the court that Annandale

consented to their doing work on the property. 

In fact, Annandale’s subsequent complaints to ASPA indicate that he not

only lacked knowledge of the extent of the work, but also that he did not give

ASPA consent to perform it.  In any case,

consent to enter and work on property does not justify total government taking.

 

This case involves forced preemption of private

property by a government entity.  At the

time of the trespass, on January 23, 1995, ASPA rules specified that no

buildings, structures, or residences were to be built over public sewers.  In invading and clearing Annandale’s land

without an easement or other proper authorization, making the land unfit for

any other use, ASPA embarked on an unauthorized taking.  Such unilateral takings are regulated by

definitively proscribed legal standards for condemnation. A.S.C.A. §§

43.1001-.1036 detail procedures such as filing a comprehensive complaint with

the High Court and/or Attorney General, service of notice, and payment of

compensation for private property taken. 

These procedures protect the property and personages of individual

citizens against cooption by arbitrary authority.  Violation of these procedures by a government

entity is unlawful and unjust.

 

ASG and ASPA failed their duty to comply with the

procedures set forth in A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1001-.1036.  ASPA did not request that ASG condemn

Annandale’s land until March 6, 1995, about six weeks after Fletcher entered

the land.  ASG did not file a complaint

to condemn the land until March 14, 1995, almost two months after the

entry.  We thus find that Fletcher, ASPA

and ASG engaged in intentional and unlawful interference with Annandale’s land

between January 23, 1995 and March 14, 1995. 

Clearly, their joint activity constitutes trespass.

 

II.  Basis for Relief

 

We now turn to the issue of damages.  Annandale’s original complaint, filed on

March 14, 1995, states a slightly different basis for relief than does his

trial memorandum, submitted on July 10, 2000. 

Annandale’s counterclaim and cross-claim seek punitive and compensatory

damages for damage to his land.  His

trial brief, however, seeks compensatory damages for indemnity or restitution

for “loss of plantings,” emotional distress, and attorney’s fees and costs, and

not merely for damages to property.  A

threshold issue is thus whether the court may recognize the additional bases

for relief requested in the trial brief that were not mentioned in the

counterclaim or cross-claim.  In legal

terms, the issue is whether the added terms of Annandale’s trial brief

constitute a valid amendment of his claims.

 

A.  Amending

Pleadings

 

[7-8] T.C.R.C.P. 15(a) delineates

the parameters for amending or supplementing pleadings.  It states:

 

A party may amend his pleadings as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.  Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only

by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall

be freely given when justice so requires.

 

See also 6 Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1486 (2d ed.

1990).  This Court construes pleadings

and their amendments liberally, in order to do “substantial justice,” even if

the pleadings occasionally do not strictly comply with formal

requirements.  T.C.R.C.P. 8(f); see,

e.g., Dev. Bank v. Ilalio, 5 A.S.R.2d 110, 115-16 (Trial Div.

1987).  We give wide latitude to parties

to amend material pleadings.  See,

e.g., Thomsen v. Bank of Hawaii, 28 A.S.R.2d 86, 87 (Trial

Div. 1995).  There are, however, certain

limitations to our vast discretion to freely give leave to amend

pleadings.  In McKenzie v. Le`iato,

27 A.S.R.2d 53, 55 (Trial Div. 1994), we applied the U.S. Supreme Court ruling

in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183 (1962), which requires that

a trial court give justifying reasons for denying an opportunity to amend a

complaint.  Foman suggested

several viable factors for a trial court’s denial of a motion for leave to

amend:

 

In the absence of any apparent or declared

reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,

undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,

futility of amendment, etc.,–the leave sought should, as the rules require, be

‘freely given.’

 

Foman, 371 U.S. at 183.  Annandale has not officially applied for

leave to amend or to supplement his complaint. 

Instead, he has added extraneous language to his trial memorandum, and

left it to the discretion of this court to determine whether “justice so

requires” our recognizing the implicit amendment.

 

[9] The record shows that Annandale had

more than ample time to amend his counterclaim and cross-claim.  The condemnation complaint was filed on March

14, 1995, and a partial judgment was entered on December 10, 1997, as to Parcel

A.  More than two years then

passed, during which no pleading or action on the case was taken by either

party.  On December 22, 1999, an order by

this court was entered declaring that the case was not diligently prosecuted,

and that the case would be dismissed with prejudice within 30 days unless good

cause was shown otherwise.  Exactly 30

days later, the motion for hearing to set trial date was filed, and the trial

was held on July 10, 2000.  Thus,

Annandale had a wide berth of time—more than five years—during which he might

have moved to amend or supplement his counterclaim and cross-claim, but did

not. Such undue delay precludes us from giving Annandale leave to amend his

pleadings.

 

Moreover, allowing such a last-minute amendment would

be prejudicial to the opposing parties. 

One novel basis for relief slipped into a trial memorandum in the form

of seemingly innocuous, extraneous language. Because of the prejudice that

allowing such unstated ‘amendments’ would cause, we follow our ruling in McKenzie

and refuse to extend our obligation to liberally construe pleadings to avoid

injustice, towards refashioning a party’s theory of relief.  McKenzie, 27 A.S.R.2d at 67.

 

[10] A minimum requirement for a party’s amendment of pleadings

is that it submit a motion for leave to amend under T.C.R.C.P. 15 (a).  The procedural requirement of filing a motion

for leave to amend enables the court to consider the justice of the

filing.  It places the opposing party on

timely and proper notice of the new claim for relief, and more importantly,

enables that party to contest the claim in open court.  The extraneous language included in

Annandale’s final memorandum constitutes a deviation from High Court Rules and

does not comport with the court’s standards of due process.  We will not accept Annandale’s implicit

“amendment” of his counterclaim and cross-claim because of undue delay, and

because doing so would be unduly burdensome and prejudicial to ASG, ASPA, and

Fletcher.

 

Therefore, based on our

court rules and the relevant case law, we will not recognize the new claim for

compensatory relief stated in Annandale’s trial memorandum–specifically, the

claim for emotional loss. Referring back to Annandale’s original pleadings, and

considering that the condemnation and arbitration have taken since place to

account for lost value of the land itself, we consider Annandale’s claims to be

as follows: against ASPA and Fletcher for willful trespass and destruction of

property.

 

 

 

B.  Compensatory

Damages

 

[11]

Annandale’s complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages, excluding just

compensation for the depreciated value of the land, which is accounted for in

the condemnation proceedings. 

Compensatory damages are designed to compensate for actual injury or

loss, and punitive damages are awarded as punishment or deterrence for

particularly egregious conduct.  Nappe

v. Anschelewitz, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (N.J. 1984).  The issue is what compensation may be justly

afforded to Annandale for the destruction of the vegetation, fences and walls

on his property caused by the trespass.

 

[12-14] We have previously addressed the issue of compensation for

victims of past trespass for damages to land in Letuli in which we set

our standard for compensatory damages. Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at

85.  Compensatory damages are to be

measured by (1) diminution in value, i.e., difference between market value of

land before and after the harm, or cost of restoration when appropriate, (2)

loss of use of the land, and (3) discomfort and annoyance to the occupant of

the land.  Id.; see also Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 929(1)

(1965).  If a severable thing attached to

the land is damaged, recovery of the loss in market value to the attachment is

an optional approach.  Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 929(2)

(1965).  In any case, proof of pecuniary

loss is required. “In the absence of such proof, which can occur when

substantial actual damages are not susceptible to precise proof, the damage

entitlement is limited to nominal damages in a trivial amount.”  Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 85; see also

Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 907 (1965).

 

[15] In the course of their trespass,

ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher destroyed plants, fences and walls on Annandale’s

land.  However, no evidence was presented

regarding the market value of the damaged vegetation, fences, and walls.  In the absence of such evidence, we must rule

according to our holding in Letuli, where no evidence was presented as

to the market value or other readily ascertainable pecuniary value, and where

we could not, therefore, award compensatory damages.

 

[16-17] As discussed in great detail in Dixon

v. City of Phoenix, case authority points to a restoration cost exception

to the market value measure of damages where landscaping and vegetation have

intrinsic value to the landowner.  845

P.2d 1107, 1116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). 

Such intrinsic value is assumed, and does not require evidentiary

support, where the property damaged is a homesite or recreational lot. See Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 929 cmt. b (1965); Thatcher v. Lane Construction Co.,

254 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970); Rector, Etc. v. C.S. McCrossan,

235 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975); Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d

615, 618 (Ohio Ct. App.1984).

 

[I]n appropriate cases, a landowner whose vegetation has been destroyed

by a trespass may receive damages based on restoration costs.  This is so even when the amount may exceed

the diminution in market value of the real property on which the vegetation

grew.

 

Dixon, 845 P.2d at 1117.  Dixon also emphasized that only reasonable

costs of replacing destroyed vegetation may be recovered.  Id.

 

[18] We do not

find sufficient indication, either by evidence or reason, of any intrinsic

value of the lost landscaping and vegetation. 

The property in question was a rental property rather than a homesite or

recreational lot for which intrinsic meaning has been found in order to apply the

restoration cost standard for compensatory damages.  See Thatcher, 254 N.E.2d at

708; Rector, 235 N.W.2d at 610; Denoyer, 490 N.E.2d at 618. The

“intrinsic meaning” of the vegetation and attachments to Annandale’s land must

be held to be, therefore, negligible.

 

There being no evidence as to (1) the intrinsic value

of the property or else the pecuniary worth of its diminution in value due to

trespass, (2) no issue as to the loss of the land itself (that being decided by

arbitration), and (3) no “satisfactory proof of consequential illness or significant

bodily or emotional injury” to merit compensation for emotional distress, our

award of compensatory damages for trespass upon Annadale’s land is limited to

the nominal amount of $1.00.   See

Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 86,

 

C.  Punitive

Damages

 

[19-20] Punitive or exemplary damages may be

awarded whether or not compensatory damages are awarded, in order to punish a

wrongdoer as well as to deter other from similar future misconduct which

resulted in injury, loss or detriment to another.  Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 86; Nappe,

477 A.2d at 1232; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 and cmts. b & c (1965). 

The punitive award is based on whether the trespasser’s conduct was

wantonly reckless or malicious.  The

offender must have engaged in “intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an

‘evil-minded act’ or an act accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of

the rights of another.”  Nappe,

477 A.2d at 1230.

 

[21] The actions of ASG, ASPA, and

Fletcher in trespassing upon Annandale’s land do not appear to have occurred

with any evil intent. However, their actions did occur with reckless disregard

for Annandale’s rights as a private property owner, and in violation of the

contract between ASPA and Fletcher and ASPA’s rules regarding obtaining

easements or condemnation before commencing work.  The trespass continued despite repeated

written requests to cease.  In Letuli, we awarded the plaintiff

$1,500.00 in punitive damages where the defendant bulldozed natural growth

trees on a 12-foot right of way in malicious retribution for the plaintiff’s

refusal to clear the property for the defendant’s ocean view.  The factors we considered in that case were

“the character of the defendant’s act, the nature of the plaintiff’s harm, and

defendant’s responsible station in life.” 

Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 86.

 

In this case, the property in question involves more

or less 0.145 acres, the destruction of erected fences and shrubs, and

sloppiness in procuring the requisite consent, easement or condemnation action

before commencing sewer line work on private property.  ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher trespassed upon the

property illegally for more than two months despite Annadale’s immediate and

repeated notice and protest.  For

punishment of such wanton disregard of the rights of private property owners,

and for deterrence against ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher whose frequent

infrastructure work and abundant resources necessitate attention to detail and

care, we award Annadale $3,000.00 in punitive damages.

 

[22] Furthermore, A.S.C.A. § 43.5051 requires that damages be

trebled in trespass cases where the damage is to “timber, young tree growth, or

products of tree growth . . . , or cultivated grounds” without lawful authority

or permission.  We thus award to Annandale

a total of $9,003.00 in compensatory and punitive damages.

 

D.  Attorney’s

Fees and Costs

 

[23-24] Attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recoverable by a

prevailing party, but may be awarded when an opposing party has acted in bad

faith, wantonly, oppressively or when a statute dictates.  See Fiaui v. Faumuina, 27 A.S.R.2d 36,

42 (Trial Div. 1994); F.D. Rich Co.v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S.

116, 129 (1973).  Annandale is deserving

of attorney’s fees in this case, where public agencies and their agents acted

oppressively and in wanton disregard of the valid property claims of an

individual citizen.  Annandale is also

entitled to costs of suit.  T.C.R.C.P.

54(d).

Order

 

1.  There being no proof of compensatory damages,

ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher are jointly and severally liable for $1.00 in nominal damages

to Annandale for willful trespass to his land.

 

2.  Due to their reckless indifference to

Annandale’s right to private property protected by the laws of American Samoa,

as well as the contract between ASPA and Fletcher and ASPA’s rules, ASG, ASPA,

and Fletcher are jointly and severally liable for $3,000.00 in punitive

damages.

 

3.  Pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.5051, the total

amount of damages jointly and severally owed by ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher to

Annandale are tripled to the total amount of $9,0003.00.

 

4.  ASG, ASPA and Fletcher are also jointly and severally

liable to pay to Annandale attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,500.00 plus his

actual costs of suit.

 

It is so ordered.

 

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